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RECENT CASES
in an era when nearly all business is carried on through
natural or corporate agents-these are the factors which
should determine the future of the election rule. For
these are the factors upon which depends the real problem:
Of what contemporary utility is the entire law of undis-
closed principal? Failure of the courts to consider2 0 these
governing factors accounts for the vacuous unrealism which
distinguishes the twentieth century case law in this area.
DUE PROCESS
BROAD SCOPE OF STATE REGULATORY
POWER REAFFIRMED
The Family Security Life Insurance Company, a corpora-
tion, was promoted by South Carolina funeral directors. Most
of its stockholders and agents were either owners or em-
ployees of mortuaries.' The company had qualified to do
business and its agents had been duly licensed under the
provisions of a very comprehensive and stringent state in-
20. Even the reporters of the Restatement of Agency failed to ap-
proach the election rule realistically. As to the undisclosed principal
situation they followed what they perceived to be the weight of author-
ity and adopted the election requirement. But the reporters voiced
their dissatisfaction with the rule. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, EXPLANA-
TORY NoTEs § 435 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929). At least in the partially
disclosed principal situation they did not advocate the application of
the election requirement. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 184, 210, 336,
337 (1933). They should have felt no compulsion to follow such cases
as Georgi v. Thomas Co., 225 N. Y. 410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919) and
Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir. 1904), supporting the rule
because it "serves a good purpose" and is "founded upon a policy which
forbids T to trifle with the courts." The rule perhaps is not as
prevalent as the reporters thought it to be. Merrill, supra note 16.
For a discussion which puts aside such question-begging assumptions
as "alternate liability" and approaches the liability of A and P from
a standpoint of public policy, see Comment, 39 YALE L. J. 265 (1939),
which reaches the conclusion that T should be allowed to pursue A
and P until satisfaction, but that in the usual partially disclosed situa-
tion involving factors, brokers, etc., an early election should be re-
quired.
1. Plaintiff insurance company had 34 stockholders, all but one
of whom either owned, managed, or were employed by a mortuary. Of
the company's 79 agents, 51 were connected with undertaking establish-
ments. Its president, and four of the five directors were owners or
managers of mortuaries. See Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel,
79 F. Supp. 62, 64 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
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surance law.2 Since its organization in early 1948, the com-
pany had been engaged in writing a large amount of "pre-
paid funeral" insurance.3  Largely as a result of pressure
by competing insurance companies, 4 the South Carolina
legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful for an in-
surance company to own or operate a mortuary and for a
funeral director or mortuary employee to be licensed as an
insurance agent.5
With its existence at stake, the plaintiff insurance com-
pany brought suit in the federal district court to enjoin en-
forcement of the statute on the ground that it violated both
the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.6 The three judge court found itself un-
able to distinguish the 1928 case of Liggett v. Baldridge7 and
held in a 2-1 decision that the statute was unreasonable and
arbitrary and hence a violation of due process of law.,
2. The act gave the state insurance commissioner plenary authority
to deny or revoke licenses to any company whose operations or activi-
ties might be deemed a violation of law, unfair, unjust, or deceptive.
S. C. Acts 1947, No. 232, p. 322.
3. The insurance sold by plaintiff insurance company was ordinary
life insurance with a face value determined by the type of funeral
desired by the policy holder. Business was solicited through the mor-
tuary owners and employees as agents, and the premiums were col-
lected at the mortuary home. Matured policy proceeds were sent to
the undertaker-agent for delivery to the insured's beneficiary. A
"facility of payment" clause might be interpreted as allowing payment
of the insurance proceeds directly to an undertaker. Brief for Ap-
pellants, p. 6, Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 69 Sup. Ct.
550 (1949).
4. See Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62,
64-5 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
5. S. C. Acts 1948, No. 787, p. 1947.
The Indiana General Assembly has also sought to regulate the
relationship between life insurance companies and mortuaries. The
statute provides that the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Direc-
tors may refuse to grant or renew a license, or may revoke a license
if the holder thereof has participated in or is participating in any
scheme or plan in the nature of a burial association or a burial certifi-
cate or membership certificate plan. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933)
§ 63-727 (d).
6. Suits in federal district court to enjoin enforcement of a state
statute must be heard and determined by a court composed of three
judges, of whom at least one must be a circuit judge. In such cases
appeal to the Supreme Court exists as a matter of right. These pro-
visions, previously found in 36 STAT. 557 (1910), as amended, 43 STAT.
938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1948), and 26 STAT. 827 (1891), as
amended, 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 345 (1946), were repealed
and substantially reenacted by the Judicial Code and Judiciary Act
of 1948, 62 STAT. 992 (1948).
7. 278 U. S. 105 (1928).
8. Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62 (E. D. S.
C. 1948). Cf. Kirtley v. State, 84 N. E.2d 712 (Ind. 1949), in
[Vol. 2.4
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On appeal, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Murphy unanimously reversed, stating, "We cannot
say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral
insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute
has no relation to the elimination of those evils. There our
inquiry must stop." Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co.,
69 Sup. Ct. 550 (1949).
Prior to 1937, the Court freely and frequently invali-
dated economic legislation on "substantive due process"
grounds. Some businesses were said not to be "affected with
a public interest," hence not subject to price regulation.10
"Freedom of contract" became a hallowed right not to be re-
stricted except for very substantial reasons." In some in-
stances at least, the Court seemed to adopt the criterion that
where a statute gave rise to a very substantial deprivation
which the Indiana court held an anti-ticket-scalping statute, IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns 1942 Repl.) § 10-4913, invalid under the Indiana
Constitution. The Indiana court expressly disapproved the United
States Supreme Court's post-1937 trend in due process review,
and followed the theory laid down in such pre-1937 cases as
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928), [overruled by Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941)] and Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273
U. S. 418 (1927) (expressly disapproved in Olsen v. Nebraska, supra
at 245). Liggett v. Baldridge was also cited with approval.
9. If, and to the extent that, this language implies that such an
inquiry can even begin, it represents a. retreat by the minority of the
Court from its doctrinal position that the due process clause, in itself,
does not empower the Court to review economic regulation. "And I
further contend that the 'natural law' formula which the Court
uses to reach its conclusion ... should be abandoned as an incongruous
excrescence on our Constitution. I believe that formula to be itself a
violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the
expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields
where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power."
Mr. Justice Black dissenting for himself and Douglas, J., in Adamson
v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 75 (1947). See also Black, Douglas, and
Murphy, JJ., concurring in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 599 (1942); Mr. Justice Black's concurrence
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 155 (1938).
While Mr. Justice Murphy seems in substantial agreement with Justices
Black and.Douglas, the firmness of his position is somewhat shaken by
his separate dissent in Adamson v. California, supra, at 124. Mr.
Justice Rutledge's exact position is similarly in some doubt in view of
his joining Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in the Adamson case. For a
general discussion of the views of the individual justices in regard to
the scope of due process review, see Note, 24 IND. L. J. 89, 91-4 (1948).
It is probably grasping for straws, however, to read doctrinal signi-
ficance into the somewhat ambiguous language of the instant case.
10. E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride,
277 U. S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
11. Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
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of rights, the evils sought to be corrected should be reason-
ably commensurate. In other words, the test of constitution-
ality sometimes came very near being whether (in the opinion
of the Court) the regulation was sufficiently necessary to
justify its existence-whether or not the legislature should
have taken fairer and less drastic steps. 12
Since 1937, however, the Supreme Court has followed a
policy of "judicial self restraint" in dealing with claims that
economic regulatory statutes contravene the requirements of
due process of law.13  While the majority of the Court in-
sists that it does retain power to invalidate "unreasonable"
and "arbitrary" statutes on substantive due process
grounds,1 4 the bases of such invalidation have been narrowed
almost to the vanishing point. Nebbia v. New York 5 es-
tablished that, as a practical matter, all businesses are sub-
ject to statutory price regulation under the state police power.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish-G read "freedom of contract"
12. See e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 278
(1932); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928); Tyson &
Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 442-3 (1927); Weaver v. Palmer Bros.
Co., 270 U. S. 402, 414-5 (1926); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.
S. 504, 513 (1924); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 595-6 (1917).
The dictum of Mr. Justice Brown in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133,
137 (1894), that the means must be "reasonably necessary for the ac-
complishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individ-
uals," seems to have afforded the pre-1937 Court at least one of
the bases for the development of the dogma of "necessity" as a test of
constitutionality. See, e.g., Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra at 513.
See also Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARv. L. REV. 943, 955, 966-7 (1927).
13. See Comment, 26 TEX. L. REV. 47, 56 (1947). For a definition
of "judicial self restraint," see Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 78-9 (1936): ". . . while unconstitutional
exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the gov-
ernment is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal
of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but
to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government."
14. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U. S. 575, 586 (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U. S. 144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379,
399 (1937).
15. 291 U. S. 502, 536 (1934): "The phrase, 'affected with a
public interest,' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that
an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public
good."
16. 300 U. S. 379 (1937). Two cases decided during the present
term have reaffirmed the Court's position on this point. Lincoln Fed-
eral Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 251
(1949); AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 258 (1949).
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out of constitutional law. Olsen v. Nebraska17 stated that the
Court will not concern itself with the wisdom, need, or ap-
propriateness of the legislation. Nor will the fairness of the
statute 8 nor the hardship which it places upon those affected
by the act 9 be considered. Motivation of the legislature is
likewise irrelevant.20  The present Court attaches a presump-
tion of constitutionality to a statute, which places upon the
party challenging it the burden of negativing every con-
ceivable basis upon which the statute might be upheld.21
Thus in order that a statute today be declared unconstitu-
tional, it must be so plainly arbitrary and unreasonable that
no rational man could think otherwise. 22  In view of these
pronouncements of the post-1937 Court, it has been assumed
in some quarters that as a practical matter the due process
clause has been eliminated as a bar to legislation in the
economic field..2 3
17. 313 U. S. 236, 246 (1941). See also Queenside Hills Realty
Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80, 82 (1946); Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321 U. S. 50, 64 (1944); Wickard v.
Filburne, 317 U. S. 111, 129 (1942); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 394 (1940); Osborne v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53,
66 (1940); South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 190-1 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379, 399 (1937).
18. See Wickard v. Filburne, 317 U. S. 111, 129 (1942); Watson
v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 403 (1941).
19. "It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining
hand on the self-interest of the regulated and that advantages from
the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflict of economic in-
terest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely
left under our system to resolution by Congress under its more flexible
and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend them-
selves to judicial determination." Wickard v. Filburne, 317 U. S. 111,
129-30 (1942). See Illinois Cigarette Service Co. v. City of Chicago,
89 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Bernstein S. S. Line,
44 F. Supp. 19, 20 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
20. See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 362 (1945) ; Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 401 (1940); Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513-4 (1937).
21. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152
(1938); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940). Previously,
the establishment of but one irrational basis of the legislation was suf-
ficient to shift the burden of justifying the statute to its proponent.
See Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165, 170 (1935).
22. See Sage Stores v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32, 35 (1944); Carolene
Products Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 19, 31-2 (1944); Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509 (1937).
23. "It is at least fair to say that in the past few years the Due
Process Clause has ambled right out of the U. S. Reports, at least
so far as economic legislation is concerned. . . ." Braden, Umpire to
1949]
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Nevertheless, despite the view of a minority of the
present Court,24 there remains a theoretical line of unreason-
ableness beyond which the legislature may not pass.25  In
determining whether a particular statute has passed this
line, the announced test of "reasonableness" is of little
value in itself. The test, for all the variety of verbal
formulations in which it has been expressed,'2 6 is essentially
a subjective one, becoming objective only to the extent that
it has been translated by the Supreme Court into terms of
decided cases.2 7 Thus, if a lower court seeks guidance more
reliable than its own ideas of reasonableness, it can look
only to these decided cases. But, since the definite change
in philosophy which took place in the 1930's concerning judi-
cial review of legislation, the lower court will find no eco-
nomic legislation has been invalidated on due process grounds.
Therefore, if the statute under consideration seems more un-
reasonable than any of the statutes considered by the post-
1937 Supreme Court, the lower court, aided only by the ver-
bal tests set forth by the Court, is thrown back upon its own
the Federal System, 10 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 27, 48 (1942). "The due
process clause may be dead so far as it may be a device by which the
Court will overturn legislation in the economic field." Comment, 26
TEX. L. REV. 47, 56 (1947).
24. Justices Black and Douglas and, less certainly, Justices Murphy
and Rutledge constitute this minority. See note 9 supra.
25. See note 14 supra.
26. E.g., "... the guaranty of due process demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1934).
"We are not concerned . .. with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness
of the legislation." Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246 (1941).
. regulatory legislation ... is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legisla-
tors." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152(1938).
27. Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that such standards are de-
finable only in terms of concrete cases: "With regard to the police
power, as elsewhere in the law, lines are pricked out by the gradual
approach and contact of decisions on the opposing sides." Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 112 (1911). While it is true, as stated
by Mr. Justice Holmes, that indefinite standards exist in many branches
o4 the law, the standard- in most instances becomes "defined" in terms
of decided cases which fall on either side of the line (e.g., the "un-
reasonable restraint of trade" cases under the Sherman Act). How-
ever, since all the "substantive" due process cases decided under the
post-1937 philosophy fall on the "reasonable" side of the line, the
limit of "unreasonableness" is undefined and must be determined sub-jectively.
[Vol. 24
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subjective conceptions of what is an unreasonable regula-
tion.
The present case placed the district court in just such
a position. The statute under consideration seems more
nearly "unreasonable" than any considered by the post-1937
Court.28 The lower court, in deciding upon the reasonable-
ness of the statute unaided by modern precedent, found an
analogy in the 1928 case of Liggett v. Baldridge.29 That case
concerned a Pennsylvania statute which required that all
stockholders of corporations owning drug stores be licensed
pharmacists. The state already had a comprehensive set of
laws regulating pharmacies in the interest of public health.
The Supreme Court concluded that mere stock ownership in
a corporation could have no real and substantial relation
to the public health and added that a state could not pro-
hibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unneces-
sary restrictions upon them.30
Brief consideration of the Liggett case will suffice to
show that it is inconsistent with modern due process de-
cisions. The Court in that case was obviously concerned
with the necessity of passing such a statutea1 The drastic
measure imposed by the legislature was not commensurate
with the evil to be corrected, and therefore under the philoso-
phy of the day was unreasonable.32 Since the public health
was already protected by other statutes, the Court's conclu-
sion that the statute in controversy was unnecessary and thus
unreasonable was more easily reached.3 3  The Court also
utilized a presumption of unreasonableness, since the burden
of proving the statute a valid exercise of the police power
28. Compare, e.g., the statute involved in Queenside Realty Co. v.
SaxI, 328 U. S. 80 (1946); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941);
Railroad Commission v. Rowan & N. Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940); Os-
born v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 (1940); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379 (1937).
29. 278 U. S. 105 (1928).
30. 7d. at 113.
31. The "public-health" jargon of the Liggett case was obviously
fictional. While phrased in terms of public health legislation, and
while the Court talked in those terms, the statute was really anti-
chain store legislation. See Notes, 24 ILL. L. REv. 104, 104-5 (1929);
4 NoTR DAME LAw. 397, 399-400 (1929); 7 TEX. L. REV. 474, 476(1929); 3 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 169 (1929); 15 VA. L. REV. 376 (1929).
32. See Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U, S. 105, 112-3 (1928).
33. Ibid.
1949]
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was placed upon the state.3 4  It is very probable that if the
exact Liggett case should arise today, the statute would be
upheld. However, since Liggett v. Baldridge had not been
overruled,3 5 it was rationally defensible for the district court
to conclude as it did, that that case was still binding author-
ity and was sufficiently similar to the present case to be
determinative of the issue. Further, even though the dis-
trict court might feel that the Liggett case would be decided
differently under the modern theory, of due process review,
overruling of that case was not within its province.36
In reversing, however, the Supreme Court, probably be-
cause of judicial reluctance to overrule prior decisions when
not absolutely necessary, 37 did not overrule Liggett. Content
with pointing out the wide difference in due process philoso-
phy between that utilized in the Liggett decision and that
existing today, Justice Murphy bluntly and summarily dis-
tinguished the Liggett case on its facts.3 8 The only rational
interpretation of the decision is that the Liggett case has
now been distinguished out of existence, or, at very least,
has been confined to its exact fact situation." It can cer-
tainly no longer serve as either a prop or a stumbling block
for the lower courts.
34. "If detriment to the public health thereby has resulted or is
threatened, some evidence of it ought to be forthcoming. None has beenproduced, and so far as we are informed, either by the record or
outside of it, none exists. The claim, that mere ownership of a drug
store by one not a pharmacist bears a reasonable relation to the publichealth, finally rests upon conjecture, unsupported by anything of sub-
stance. This is not enough ... ." Id. at 114. Cf. Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U. S. 236. 246 (1941): "There is no necessity for the state to
demonstrate before us that evils persist despite the competition which
attends the bargaining in this field."
35. It has not been cited by the Supreme Court since 1933, however.
36. See Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F. Supp. 62,
68-9 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
37. And possibly to preserve unanimity.
38. See Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 550,
553 (1949).
39. The language of the opinion seems studiously calculated to
avoid indicating any approval of the Liggett case over and above what-
ever approval may be implied from the failure to overrule it. Ibid.
While the cases are obviously distinguishable on their facts, it is con-
siderably more difficult to distinguish them on principle: in both
statutes there was a complete prohibition of a class from engaging
in an otherwise lawful business; in both the avowed public interest
was already protected by a comprehensive set of laws. If, as Mr. Justice
Murphy states, "The Pennsylvania statute was clearly less adapted to
the recognized evil than the, one now before us" (Ibid.), then the differ-
ence is one of degree of wisdom, need, or appropriateness, with which
the present Court is not supposed te concern itself. Olsen v. Nebraska,
,13 U. S. 236 (1941).
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The present decision demonstrates even more conclusive-
ly than previous cases the wide scope which the legislatures
have in regulating economic matters. So far as due process
is concerned, the field is entirely clear for the lower federal
courts to uphold any and all economic regulatory statutes.
It would seem advisable and entirely proper for them to do
exactly that. If the elusive limit of legislative power in this
area exists at all, it is known only to the Supreme Court.
Unless and until the Court gives substance, in the form of
decided cases, to the theory that a limit exists, the lower
federal courts may very well operate upon the assumption
that no economic regulation violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
4 0
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
NECESSITY OF DELIVERY OF MEMORANDUM
Gall filed a complaint relying on an agreement by the
Brashiers to lease certain Oklahoma oil land to him for five
years. He alleged that the Brashiers were to complete the
oil and gas lease on a form furnished by him and to forward
the lease to a bank with draft attached for the lease price,
payable at a specified date. The Brashiers filled out the
lease in the office of their attorney, but the following day
40. So far as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is concerned, the same observation applies with equal force to state
courts. But state courts of a mind to invalidate economic regulation
have held that the due process clause (or some other provision) of
their respective state constitutions places a greater limitation upon
legislative power than does the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare
Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N. W.2d 507 (1943), and State Board
of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N. E.2d (1942), with
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S: 236 (1941), and Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502 (1934). Compare Illinois C. R. R. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm., 387 Ill. 256, 56 N. E.2d 432 (1944), with Federal Power Comm.
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942). Compare Cincinnati
v. Correll, 141 Ohio 535, 49 N. E.2d 412 (1943), with West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). See also the recent case of Kirt-
ley v. State, 84 N. E.2d 712 (Ind. 1949), discussed note 8 supra.
In view of the holdings of the state courts in the cases compared
above, it is possible that the petitioning insurance company in the
present case may yet prevail if it should choose to carry its fight to
the state courts. Montana and Kentucky have declared similar statutes
unconstitutional under their state constitutions. Montana v. Gateway
Mortuaries, 87 Mont. 225, 287 Pac. 156 (1930); Kenton & Campbell
Benevolent Burial Association v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233, 200 S. W.2d
120 (1946). And the issue of constitutionality under the state consti-
tution is clearly not res judicata. Boomer v. Olsen, supra.
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